Summa Contra Gentiles Bk. 1, Ch 12
Posted by Dim Bulb on January 31, 2009
Text in red are my notations.
Chapter 12
Concerning The Opinion Of Those Who Say That The Existence Of God Cannot Be Proved, And That It Is Held By Faith Alone.
In chapter 10 the Saint presented the opinion of those who held that the existence of God was self-evident, and responded to those arguments in chapter 11. Here, as the title indicates, he is presenting (and responding to) the position of those who eschew reason in relation to the question can the existence of God be demonstrated? In chapter 13 he will give his famous “arguments in proof of God’s existence.”
The term quiddity is defined as follows: Quiddity = a synonym of essences by which one answers the question about a thing, “what is it?” (Quidditas = synonymum essentiae, quo respondetur quaestioni super rem “quid est ?’ SOURCE,see #95)
The Position that we have taken is also assailed by the opinion of certain others, whereby the efforts of those who endeavor to prove that there is a God would again be rendered futile. For they say that it is impossible by means of the reason to discover that God exists, and that this knowledge is acquired solely by means of faith and revelation. (St Thomas also deals with this issue in the ST. I, 2. This was the position of Moses Maimonides)
In making this assertion some were moved by the weakness of the arguments which certain people employed to prove the existence of God.
Possibly, however, this error might falsely seek support from the statements of certain philosophers, who show that in God essence and existence are the same, namely that which answers to the question, What is He? and that which answers to the question, Is He? Now it is impossible by the process of reason to acquire the knowledge of what God is. Wherefore seemingly neither is it possible to prove by reason whether God is.
Again. If, as required by the system of the Philosopher (Posterior Analytics II,9. 93b, 22), in order to prove whether a thing is we must take as principle the signification of its name, and since according to the Philosopher (4 Metaph IV, 7, This link is to Thomas’ commentary on Metaphysics, Lecture 16. see #391 and Thomas’ note at #733) the signification of a name is its definition: there will remain no means of proving the existence of God, seeing that we lack knowledge of the divine essence or quiddity.
Again. If the principles of demonstration becomes known to us originally through the senses, as is proved in the Posterior Analytics (I. 18 see footnote 1 below) , those things which transcend all sense and sensible objects are seemingly indemonstrable. Now such is the existence of God. Therefore it cannot be demonstrated.
The falseness of this opinion is shown to us first by the art of demonstration, which teaches us to conclude causes from effects. Secondly, by the order itself of sciences: for if no substance above sensible substances can be an object of science, there will be son science above Physics,, as stated in 4 Metaphysics (See book 4, chap. 2). Thirdly, by the effects of the philosophers who have endeavored to prove the existence of God. Fourthly, by the apostolic truth which asserts (Rom 1:20) that the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.
Nor should we be moved by the consideration that in God essence and existence are the same, as the first argument contended. For this is to be understood of the existence by which God Subsists in Himself, of which we are ignorant as to what kind of a thing it is, even as we are ignorant as to what kind of a thing it is, even as we are ignorant of His essence. But it is not to be understood of that existence which is signified by the composition of the mind. For in this way it is possible to prove the existence of God, when our mind is led by demonstrative arguments to form a proposition stating that God is.
Moreover. In those arguments whereby we prove the existence of God, it is not necessary that the divine essence or quiddity be employed as the middle term, as the second argument supposed: but instead of the quiddity we take His effects as the middle term, as is the case in a posteriori reasoning: and from these effects we take the signification of this word God. For all the divine names are taken either from the remoteness of god’s effects from Himself, or from some relationship between god and His effects.
I tis also evident from the fact that, although God transcends all sensibles and sensed, His effects from which we take the proof that God exists, are sensible objects. Hence our knowledge, even of things which transcend the senses, originates from the senses.
Footnotes:
It is also clear that the loss of any one of the senses entails the loss of a corresponding portion of knowledge, and that, since we learn either by induction or by demonstration, this knowledge cannot be acquired. Thus demonstration develops from universals, induction from particulars; but since it is possible to familiarize the pupil with even the so-called mathematical abstractions only through induction-i.e. only because each subject genus possesses, in virtue of a determinate mathematical character, certain properties which can be treated as separate even though they do not exist in isolation-it is consequently impossible to come to grasp universals except through induction. But induction is impossible for those who have not sense-perception. For it is sense-perception alone which is adequate for grasping the particulars: they cannot be objects of scientific knowledge, because neither can universals give us knowledge of them without induction, nor can we get it through induction without sense-perception. (Source. Some copyright laws apply, see HERE).
